This paper develops a new tractable strategic theory of counterfeiting as a multi-market large game played by good and bad guys. There is free entry of bad guys, who choose whether to counterfeit, and what quality to produce. Opposing them is a continuum of good guys who select a costly verification effort. Counterfeiting equilibrium consists of a "cat and mouse" game between effort and quality, and a collateral "hot-potato" passing game among good guys. With log-concave verification costs, counterfeiters producer better quality at higher notes, but verifiers try sufficiently harder that the verification rate still rises. We prove that the unobserved counterfeiting rate is hill-shaped in the note, vanishing at extremes. We also deduce all comparative statics graphically.
Counterfeiting is inherently a deception exercise. A theory should capture the competing efforts of bad guys to successfully fool victims and of good guys to avoid being fooled. We develop a spartan model of this conflict in which costly effort and counterfeit quality jointly determine the verification rate. In particular, we introduce a novel derived verification function of effort and quality that affords a cardinal meaning for counterfeit quality. The paper follows the unfolding clash between verification effort and counterfeit quality, as either as the denomination stakes amplify, or other features of the counterfeiting game change -like the legal, production, or verification costs. This cat and mouse game is an independent contribution of the paper, and should be a useful model of other variable intensity deception games like warfare and tax evasion.
With homogeneous good guys and bad guys, we can solve the cat and mouse game and hot potato games recursively. When we assume a log-concave verification cost function and a monotonic cost of quality elasticity, the model matches the observed comparative statics. An example argues that both assumptions on cost functions are needed to explain the data. Our theorems rationalize the facts of passed and seized money. Essentially, insights about the verification rate explain the passing fraction, and thereby the ratio of seized to total counterfeit money (#1). That quality rises in the note means that counterfeiting costs rise in the note, tempering the fall in the passing fraction. The rising counterfeiting and verification rates offer insights into the passed rate (#2). Since the counterfeit-passed ratio is inverse to the passing fraction, it then cannot rise 1-for-1 with the counterfeit value.
For instance, that the verification rate and counterfeit quality rise in the note explains our first stylized fact. Even though quality rises in the denomination, effort rises so much faster that the resulting verification rate steadily increases. Our only proviso is that the counterfeit cost elasticity does not fall in quality -as holds for most standard cost functions. The measured passing fraction falls in the counterfeit value, and the counterfeit-passed ratio thus rises.
Our model also admits expressions for several economically meaningful variables.
The street price of counterfeit notes can be approximated using the counterfeit-passed ratio, for example. This owes to equilibrium behavior by bad guys. The implied prices agree with typical estimates and anecdotal evidence. Meanwhile, equilibrium behavior by good guys in the passing game sheds light on the public's currency verification costs. Marginal verification costs equal the passed rate times the denomination, and so amount to at most 1/4 cent for the $100 bill! Our microeconomics foundation may be more aptly thought of "nano-economics". That such small verification costs explain the data testifies to the power of even slight incentives.
RELATIONSHIP TO THE LITERATURE. Despite being a longstanding problem, counterfeit money has not been studied much by economists. There are theoretical papers inspired by the classic money matching model of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) and the more closely-related Williamson and Wright (1994) . Since they assume fixed signals of the authenticity of money, they share neither our main novel strategic core nor our conclusions about the counterfeiting rate, or passed and seized money. 2 For a key point of comparison, the papers cited above assume that transactors get a free signal of the money quality after acquiring it. We instead posit that individuals verify when it can affect choice, namely when handed it. This is important, producing the strategic complements hot potato game. It also agrees with how most individuals behave: At the moment we acquire money, we check it; otherwise, it lives in our wallet.
The domestic price of U.S. notes is fixed, and by protocol do not sell at a discount.
The margin that does adjust is the verification rate. It acts an implicit price and the counterfeiting rate a market quantity. We construct a de facto general equilibrium model using this price. In contrast to earlier games with a continuum of players (see Schmeidler (1973) or Green (1984) ), ours involves two submarkets, the enmeshed hot-potato game and the cat and mouse game. The general equilibrium aspect and the unobserved counterfeiting rate are novel features for large games. Recently, large games has made a rebirth in macroeconomics. As in Angeletos and Pavan (2007) , our payoffs depend on the average action, one's own action, and a state variable. But here, the counterfeiting rate (the state variable) is endogenous. Our usage of verification is reminiscent of the logic underlying a recent exciting work in macroeconomics on "rational inattention" (Sims, 2003) . That literature vein assumes that the agent cannot observe the true state, but is constrained by bandwidth. Here, we explicitly model the cost of acquiring a more accurate signal about the state.
We first lay out the model. For definiteness, we use the language of counterfeit money. We establish equilibrium existence and uniqueness, and then illustrate it in a fully solved example using geometric verification and counterfeit quality cost functions. By using formal proofs to establish the slopes of curves, we are able to use familiar graphical reasoning to establish most comparative statics. We then show how our model explains the facts about seized and passed money.
2 In Green and Weber (1996) , only government agents can descry the counterfeit notes, whose stock is assumed exogenous, unlike here. Williamson (2002) admits counterfeits of private bank notes that are found with fixed chance; counterfeiting does not occur in most of his equilibria. Recognition of counterfeits is also random and exogenous in Nosal and Wallace (2007) , who find no counterfeiting in equilibrium with a high enough cost of counterfeit. By contrast, in our model, counterfeit quality is endogenous, and a high enough note must be counterfeited.
The Model
A. Overview. We use the language of counterfeit money. This is a dynamic discrete time story unfolding in periods 1,2,3,. . . . There are two types of risk neutral maximizing agents: In one sector of the economy is a continuum of bad guys who are potential counterfeiters. In another sector is a continuum of good guys who must transact.
Each period, bad guys choose whether to counterfeit, and if so, what quality q ≥ 0 of notes to produce. We assume that notes have a common denomination ∆ > 0. The counterfeiting rate is the fraction κ of transacted notes that are fake. The supply of counterfeit and genuine notes has value M[∆] > 0, simply treated as fixed in κ. There is an infinitely elastic supply of identical bad guys who may freely enter. Each earns zero profits every period, net of legal penalty. Counterfeiters try to pass all production, simply fixed at x > 0. 3 The value of seized money, i.e. taken by bad guys, is S[∆].
Good guys randomly meet someone and transact every period. 4 We avoid issues of inventory management by assuming that half of the good guys always acquire notes in odd periods, and spend them in even periods, while the rest do the opposite; in this way, a note is just held for one period. Nature randomly chooses whether a good guy spends his notes at a bank; bad guys never do so at a bank. If a good guy notices that another good guy's money is "hot", then it becomes worthless passed money 5 -whose total value is P [∆]. If not found to be fake, the note trades at face value ∆. These sectors interact, since counterfeiters pass some fake notes. Everyone is anonymous, with counterfeiters indistinguishable from good guys. So money changes hands not only from bad guy to good guy, but also from good guy to good guy.
Aware that they may be knowingly or unknowingly handed counterfeit currency, good guys expend effort e ≥ 0 scrutinizing any note before accepting it. Checking notes is a stochastic endeavor that transpires note by note, and is our core novel feature.
Real notes are never mistaken for counterfeit. The verification rate is the chance v ∈ [0, 1] that a fake note is so noticed. This intuitively should rise in effort e and fall in quality q. Verification efforts also help police keep other bad money out of circulation.
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Everyone acts competitively, thinking he cannot affect the actions of others. We explore the steady-state equilibrium of this model, in which the verification rate is an "implicit price" on everyone, and the counterfeiting rate a market-clearing quantity. 3 Endogenous quality is essential to explain the data. Variable production is not needed. 4 As is the norm, we ignore technicalities of randomness and independence for a continuum of events. 5 Knowingly passing on fake currency is illegal by Title 18, Section 472 of the U.S. Criminal Code. We assume that no one engages in this crime of "uttering", seeking a "greater fool" to accept bad money. 6 On its web page, the Secret Service also advises anyone receiving suspected counterfeit money: "Do not return it to the passer. Delay the passer if possible. Observe the passer's description." B. Currency Verification and Counterfeit Quality. Good guys choose how much effort to expend checking the authenticity of money before accepting it. They notice counterfeit notes with chance v ∈ [0, 1], the verification rate; they never think a real note is fake. Better quality fakes look and feel more real, which impairs verification. Specifically, the function e = qχ(v) translates effort e and quality q > 0 into a verification rate -so that doubling the quality requires twice the effort for the same verification rate. Effort costs are smooth, increasing and strictly convex 7 in v. We
exists. So verification is a derived smooth function v = V (e, q) = χ −1 (e/q) of effort and quality if e < qχ(1), and otherwise V (e, q) = 1. For any effort e ≥ 0, verification is perfect with zero quality (V (e, 0) = 1), or for low enough quality q > 0 if e > 0.
C. The Verifier's Problem. In spending periods, good guys meet random transactors with fixed chances β ∈ (0, 1), and otherwise go to a bank. These events are not choices. Banks have verifying machines or staff who spot bad money with fixed chance α ∈ (0, 1). So counterfeit money is found in transactions at the discovery rate ρ(v) =
If not signed over to another person, checks are deposited into a bank with a higher chance β ′ > β; we can handle the corner case with β ′ = 1 too. So good or bad guys with fake or real notes, have random meetings with transactors (or banks, if they are good), who might or might not verify correctly, all events being independent. In periods that he acquires a note, a good guy first invests verification effort e ≥ 0 examining it. His losses are the verification costs plus the expected note losses from the three independent events that (i) he is handed a fake note, and given that it is fake, (ii) his verifying efforts miss this fact, and (iii) the next transaction catches it. Faced with an average verification rate v, in selling periods, good guys choose their effort e to minimize their verification costs plus expected counterfeit losses next period:
We assume that χ absorbs any discounting between periods in this simple optimization.
The unobserved stock κM[∆] of counterfeit money is observably manifested by the passed money outflow P [∆] = ρ(v)κM [∆] . So the passed rate equals: 
, because fake notes must pass through police and the first verifier. So perfect verification chokes off passing (f (1) = 0), some passing occurs if no one verifies (f (0) > 0), and the passing fraction is a smooth, falling and weakly convex functioni.e. diminishing returns to police efficacy. We discipline convexity by asking for strict log-concavity in the verification rate: (log f )
E. The Counterfeiter's Problem. Bad guys freely enter if they spot any profits. There are legal, production, and distribution costs of counterfeiting. We simply assume that bad guys produce a fixed finite expected quantity x > 0 of notes. 8, 9 The human and physical capital cost c(q) of the counterfeit quality q is increasing, convex and smooth, with c ′ , c ′′ > 0 for q > 0, c(0) = 0, and c ′ (q) → ∞ as q ↑ ∞. While our laser focus on quality demands that we otherwise simplify the counterfeiters' problem, the model will still have ample predictive power. Next, since counterfeiters are invariably eventually caught, 10 we assume a fixed average present value of the punishment loss ℓ > 0. Finally, a counterfeiter's profits equal his expected revenues f (v)x∆ less his costs c(q) + ℓ:
3 Equilibrium Analysis
The Cat and Mouse Game
We now turn to a partial equilibrium, focusing first on the struggle between the quality of bad guys and the effort choice of good guys. We need only consider the way that effort holds counterfeiting profits to zero; effort optimization occurs in the next game.
We first explore how verification responds to slightly higher verification effort or counterfeit quality. Differentiating the identity qχ(V (e, q)) ≡ e in the range e ≤ qχ(1) where V is smooth, we find that qχ ′ V q + χ ≡ 0 and qχ ′ V e ≡ 1. We thus conclude:
8 With our continuum of bad guys, only expected quantity production may be random. 9 Because each passing attempt risks discovery, the marginal distribution costs rise in output. "If a counterfeiter goes out there and, you know, prints a million dollars, he's going to get caught right away because when you flood the market with that much fake currency, the Secret Service is going to be all over you very quickly. They will find out where it's coming from." -interview with Jason Kersten, author of Kersten (2005) [All Things Considered, July 23, 2005] . 10 The Secret Service estimates that the conviction rate for counterfeiting arrests close to 99%.
Lemma 1 (First Derivatives) Fix the verification effort e > 0 and counterfeit quality q > 0 so that v = V (e, q) < 1. The verification intensity rises in e and falls in q:
(a) Verification rises in effort, with slope V e (e, q) = 1/qχ
We henceforth assume that the verification costs χ are not only increasing and strictly convex but also strictly log-concave in the rate v: (log χ) ′′ < 0, and so (χ ′ /χ) ′ < 0, or χ ′′ /χ ′ < χ ′ /χ -as with geometric costs χ(v) = v r for r > 1. This rules out extreme cost functions whose marginal costs are locally exponential, for instance. Given our multiplicative cost structure, this delivers the intuitive result that while greater quality inhibits verification, this reduction itself obeys the law of diminishing returns.
Lemma 2 (Second Derivatives)
Fix effort e > 0 and quality q > 0 so that v = V (e, q) < 1. Then each has falling marginal returns, or V> 0 > V ee , and V eq < 0.
Proof: Differentiating the identity qχ(V (e, q)) ≡ e reveals that qχ
By using log-concavity of χ, we can sign both the analogously derived V eq , and V, by differentiating the identity qχ ′ V q +χ ≡ 0:
Given free entry by identical bad guys, expected profits (3) vanish. In (q, v)-space,
A cat and mouse equilibrium is a pair (q, e) yielding zero profits (4) and for which quality q maximizes profits (3) given effort e. To wit, counterfeiters are in equilibrium.
Consider such an equilibrium. For any effort e > 0, quality must be positive. For even if q ≤ e/χ(1), verification is perfect, and losses are at least ℓ. Profits are also negative if c(q) > ∆x − ℓ. Quality q is then finite and exceeds e/χ(1). In this range, V (e, q) is smooth. Then the next FOC holds at an optimum. It captures the tradeoff that higher quality notes pass more readily but cost more:
With legal costs, only notes above a threshold ∆ ≡ ℓ/(xf (0)) are counterfeited.
Theorem 0 (Non-Existence) No cat and mouse equilibrium exists for notes ∆ ≤ ∆.
For if ∆ < ∆, then profits would be less than ∆xf (0) − ℓ = 0. If ∆ = ∆, then zero profits requires that quality vanish. Verification would then be perfect for all effort e > 0, and counterfeiters would lose at least ℓ > 0. We henceforth restrict to notes ∆ > ∆, and thus with positive effort and quality in any cat and mouse equilibrium.
Lemma 1-(b) allows us to express the FOC (5) in (q, v)-space as:
Taking logarithms, we define two convenient functions of the verification rate, namely,
. These have ranked slopes:
in light of our respective log-concavity assumptions on the fraction f and costs χ.
, we may rewrite the cat and mouse equilibrium equations (4) and (6) in the equivalent additively separable forms:
Because profits fall both in quality and the verification rate, they are inversely related along the zero-profit locusΠ solving (4) or (8). Since ∆xf (0) > ℓ, we may define the verification rate v ∆ < 1 and quality q ∆ > 0 so that ∆xf (v ∆ ) = ℓ and
Next, we analyze the optimal quality locus Q * solving (6). Consider its behavior for the lowest verification rates. Since the limit of vχ ′ (v)/χ(v) as v ↓ 0 finitely exists, and −∞ < f ′ (0) < 0, the Q * locus starts at q = v = 0, and weakly initially rises in q.
In fact, its slope initially vanishes, for
This formula likewise reveals that quality explodes near the highest verification rates iff the passing fraction tends to vertical (so f ′ (v) ↓ −∞ as v ↑ 1). In this case, Q * rises at large enough qualities, and asymptotes toward v = 1.
For the global behavior of the Q * locus, first assume constant marginal returns to police interdiction, and so a linear passing fraction f (v). For instance, f (v) = 1 − v in the extreme case without police. Log-concavity of χ then implies G ′ ≥ 0. Since U ′ > 0, in this case Q * monotonely slopes upwards, hitting v = 1 at a finite quality q.
Next assume diminishing marginal returns to police interdiction, and so a strictly Figure 1 : Zero Profit and Optimal Quality Curves. The zero profit curveΠ solving (4) slopes down from (0, v ∆ ) to (q ∆ , 0), and the optimal quality locus Q * solving (6) rises from the origin. The left panel captures a necessarily monotone Q * curve without any police interdiction. The middle panel allows police interdiction, at an equilibrium. The right panels illustrate how any negatively-sloped portion of Q * is steeper than the zero profit curveΠ at an equilibrium.
convex passing function f (v). In this case, the optimal quality locus Q * may not be monotone increasing. For as we have seen, Q * bends backward iff G ′ < 0. But G is the sum of one increasing and two decreasing functions, since −f
To understand the economics behind G ′ < 0, recall that a concave function of a submodular function is submodular. Since V (e, q) is submodular (Lemma 2), the composition f (V (e, q)) is no longer submodular for a sufficiently convex passing fraction f . When this occurs, the quality that maximizes profits (3) falls in the effort e = qχ(v). So if v = χ −1 (e/q) rises, then q falls -for if not, then e and q both rise. Contradiction. Moreover, given the slopes of the Q * andΠ curves, the equilibrium is unique.
Lemma 3 (Slope of Curves) The optimal quality locus
Theorem 1 (Existence) For any ∆ > ∆, there is a unique cat and mouse equilibrium (q, e). The verification rate, effort, and quality are positive, and differentiable in ∆.
The Hot Potato Passing Game
In equilibrium, counterfeit quality q is known, and thus an effort choice is tantamount to a selection of the verification ratev = V (e, q). We may rewrite (1) as
The passing game by itself is supermodular in verification effort: For any given counterfeiting rate, one's own verification ratev is a strategic complement in (1) to the average rate v. Intuitively, one should examine a note more closely the more intensely it will be checked.
11 So the best replyv in (10) will rise in v. Supermodular games may have multiple equilibria (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990) , since the best reply functions are increasing and may multiply cross. But this is moot here, for by Theorem 1, the cat and mouse equilibrium pins down a unique verification rate v.
Since benefits in (1) are linear in verification, and costs χ strictly convex, any FOC solution is a global minimum. The FOC asserts that marginal costs and benefits of effort coincide:
Facing any average verification rate v, the homogeneous good guys naturally choose the same best responsev. So there is a unique and symmetric equilibrium withv = v = V (e, q), determined in Theorem 1, which then fixes the counterfeiting rate. It admits the economic interpretation as the ratio of marginal costs and benefits of verification per bad note:
A Stable Multimarket Counterfeiting Equilibrium
A counterfeiting equilibrium is a triple (q * , e * , κ * ) yielding equilibrium in each market:
• Verifiers' effort e * and counterfeit quality q * are a cat and mouse equilibrium.
• Given counterfeit quality q * , the effort e * by good guys is an equilibrium of the hot potato passing game for the counterfeiting rate κ * ∈ (0, 1).
Since bad guys enjoy the same zero outside option, the equilibrium verification rate v * is constant in the counterfeit money supply κ. This gives rise to the infinitely elastic counterfeiting supply curve K S at the right of Figure 2 . 12 Our model therefore admits a tractable recursive structure with an equilibrium (q * , e * , κ * ) that is computable in stages -first, (q * , e * ) is the unique cat and mouse equilibrium; then the equilibrium FOC (12) in the hot-potato game fixes κ * . That κ * < 1 is mathematically immaterial in the good guys' optimization (1), but is needed for economic sense. In Theorem 7, we derive conditions on primitives that ensure this bound. Figure 2 : Two Sector Equilibrium Logic. The same verification rate must clear two counterfeit money markets -for criminals and verifiers. The cat and mouse game equilibrium in (q, v)-space (left) yields the verification rate v * -captured in the infinitely elastic counterfeiting supply for the hot-potato game in (κ, v)-space (right).
Cat and Mouse Game Equilibrium
] is a product of weakly and strictly increasing functions when v < α, the map in (12) is strictly increasing at least when v < α. Think of v as the "price" that verifiers pay to avoid counterfeit notes, and (12) as the counterfeiting demand curve K D . This demand curve slopes upward since counterfeit notes are a "bad". The equilibrium in the right panel of Figure 2 is stable under a very natural adjustment process: Counterfeiters enter when the verification rate drops below v * . For then the counterfeit supply K S rises, pushing back toward equilibrium.
An Illustrative Example of a Counterfeiting Equilibrium
Assume that the police do not diminish the passing chance, so that f (v) = 1 − v. A geometric verification cost function χ(v) = v B is log-concave, and when B ≥ 2, is strictly convex with χ ′ (v)/v weakly increasing. With a counterfeiting cost function c(q) = q A , where A > 1, we may fully solve for the multimarket equilibrium.
Consistent with the monotonicity and curvature of the plots in the left panel of Figure 2 , the zero profit equation (4) and quality optimality equation (6) reduce to:
As we will see, quality and verification vanish near the least counterfeit denomination. Solving (13) for q and v, this threshold equals ∆ = ℓ/xf (0) = ℓ/x. And as the denomination explodes, the verification rate tends tov = AB/(1 + AB) < 1: Effort or Quality Figure 3 : Effort, Quality, and Verification. Left: We plot the verification rate against the note in our example, with A = 5, B = 3, x = 2 and ℓ = 10. The least counterfeit note is ∆ = 5, and the limit verification rate isv = 0.8. Right: We plot equilibrium verifier effort and counterfeit quality as a function of the verification rate.
So verification rises in the note ∆, but is forever imperfect. While effort e = qv B rises in ∆, quality rises much faster, and infinitely faster initially as B > 0, as seen in Figure 3 :
To this point, the economic logic turns solely on entry and quality incentives in the cat and mouse game. We now focus on the hot potato game, which fixes the counterfeiting supply. Substituting equilibrium quality and verification from (14) into (12) then yields the equilibrium counterfeiting rate κ = Bqv B−1 /(ρ(v)∆). In this example, we ignore the banking sector for simplicity, so that the discovery rate is ρ(v) = v. Not only does counterfeiting occur for all ∆ > ∆, but its rate κ is a hill-shaped function of the note: Figure 4 depicts the similarly hill-shaped plot of the passed rate p = vκ from (2), namely, p =v(1 − ∆/∆)κ. The passed rate always understates the counterfeiting rate, but the ratio p/κ rises in ∆. For large notes ∆ ↑ ∞, the passed and counterfeiting rates vanish equally fast, and p/κ tends tov < 1. Since B ≥ 2, both rates vanish for small notes ∆ ↓ ∆. But the passed rate vanishes much faster, as p/κ vanishes in this limit.
This example sheds light on the roles played by endogenous effort and quality. No variation in the data can be explained if neither is a choice variable. First, with fixed effort, counterfeiters still choose better quality at higher notes. But then verification and so the counterfeit-passed ratio 1/(1 − v) falls in the note. We will see it does not.
If we instead tied the counterfeiters' hands and fixed the quality, then a vertical line would replace the optimal quality locus in 
Comparative Statics via the Cat and Mouse Game

Shifts of One Curve Only: Legal and Verification Costs
Differentiating the zero-profit identity (4) in legal costs ℓ to get Π+ Π eė + Π ℓ = 0. Since the firm optimizes on quality, the first term cancels, by the Envelope Theorem.
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Given Π e = ∆f ′ V e < 0 and Π ℓ = −1 < 0, effort falls when legal costs rise:ė < 0.
To deduce the impact on quality and verification, we use the graphical framework. When ℓ rises, the zero profit curveΠ shifts down at each quality, because counterfeiters require lower verification effort to avoid losses. Since the optimal quality locus Q * in (9) is unaffected by ℓ, the shape of Q * alone governs changes in q and v. Because it is either upward-sloping, or downward-sloping and steeper thanΠ, we conclude: Figure 5 : Shifting Legal or Verification Costs: Theorems 2 and 3 Depicted. Top: When legal costs fall, the zero profit curveΠ shifts up (fromΠ H toΠ L , thick to thin), while the optimal quality locus Q * is unaffected. So verification v worsens, while quality falls if Q * is locally rising -and so surely for low and high notes. Bottom: Conversely, when verification costs fall,Π is unaffected, while the Q * locus shifts left (from H to L, thick to thin). So verification always improves and quality always falls.
Intuitively, with greater legal punishment for counterfeiting, the least notes can no longer be profitably counterfeited. Counterfeiting remains profitable for higher notes only because effort drops so much that the verification rate falls despite falling quality.
Next, assume that a new technology, like a black light security strip, renders the currency more verifiable. Unlike with changing legal costs, verification costs affect Q * but notΠ. All (smooth) technological improvement is captured by a simple modeling device. Let verification v with technology t cost the same as verification V(v, t), where V(v, t) smoothly falls in t and rises in v, or V t < 0 < V v . This leavesΠ unaffected, but we show in the appendix that t shifts the Q * locus in (6) left. Unlike with Theorem 2, this holds without conditions on the slope of Q * , i.e. on police efficacy (see Figure 5 ).
Theorem 3
If the verification technology improves, the effort falls, the verification rate rises, the counterfeit quality falls, and the least counterfeit note ∆ is unchanged.
Dual Shifts: Changing Denominations and Technology
Higher notes necessarily command closer scrutiny -for if verification effort did not rise in the note, then higher notes would be more profitable to counterfeit. Formally, differentiate the zero-profit identity (4) in ∆ to get Π+ Π eė + Π ∆ = 0. Thenė < 0, Figure 6 : The Changing Note: Theorem 4 Depicted. We draw the zero profit and optimal quality lociΠ and Q * for low and high notes (L and H, thin and thick). By log-concavity (7),Π shifts up more than Q * in ∆, and so quality rises. Also,Π shifts right more than Q * in ∆ by the elasticity assumption (18), raising verification.
since Π= 0 yields:
For shifts in q and v, we turn to the graphical framework. Consider the defining equations (8) and (9) for Q * andΠ. Since T ′ , U ′ > 0, both curves shift right (towards higher q) when ∆ rises. Not surprisingly, theΠ locus intercepts q ∆ and v ∆ rise in ∆.
Then the optimal quality locus Q * slopes up. If the note rises, then both Q * andΠ pull right, and the equilibrium quality rises (see Figure 6) .
Alternatively, assume G ′ (v) < 0. Then Q * slopes down. Since Q * shifts up and right in ∆, and Q * is steeper thanΠ in equilibrium (Lemma 3), quality q rises in ∆ exactly when the Q * curve rises more than theΠ curve for fixed q -exactly as seen in Figure 6 . By our equivalent additively separable equations (8) and (9), quality rises in ∆ because |F ′ (v)| > |G ′ (v)| by our log-concavity assumption (7).
Next, the verification rate v rises in ∆ exactly when theΠ curve shifts right more than Q * does, for fixed v. By (8) and (9), this holds when U ′ (q) > T ′ (q). As verified in the appendix, this holds for small and large q, and always holds with a monotone cost of quality elasticity:
Theorem 4 (a) The verification effort and verification rate, as well as the counterfeit quality, vanish as ∆ ↓ ∆. The effort and quality explode as ∆ ↑ ∞. (b) Effort and quality monotonically rise in the note ∆ > ∆. (c) The verification rate increases in ∆ at low and high notes ∆, and monotonically increases for all notes ∆ > ∆, assuming a monotone quality cost elasticity, i.e. (18).
Theorem 4 also applies to changes in the counterfeit quantity x, since it impacts the equilibrium equations (4) and (5) of the cat and mouse game in the same way as ∆.
Log-concavity is essential for monotonicity. For if |F
down, thenΠ shifts upward more than Q * when ∆ rises, thereby depressing quality.
We now offer a non-graphical economic intuition for the importance of the logconcavity of χ and f . Such assumptions preclude "near jumps" of the increasing verification cost χ, and "near flats" of the decreasing passing fraction f .
14 So if the note just rises "a little", then so does the effort e = qχ(v). To sustain zero profits (4), the passing fraction f (v) must fall "a little". If f is not log-concave, then v could rise "a lot", and so χ(v) could rise "a lot" too. Or, if χ is not log-concave, then χ(v) could rise "a lot" even if v only rises "a little". Either way, the quality q = e/χ(v) could fall.
As it happens, a closely related comparative static is technological improvementfalling production costs. As with shifting verification costs, we generally capture this by a smooth function q → Q(q, t), i.e., the quality that costs c(q) given technology t.
Then Q(q, t) falls in t and rises in q, or Q t < 0 < Q q , and we normalize Q(q, 0) ≡ q. Differentiating the zero profit identity Π(q, e, ∆) ≡ 0 in the technology t, we find that effort rises in t, just as it fell in ℓ. Next, we turn once more to the graphical framework. Like the note, the cost function affects both theΠ and Q * curves. The situation resembles that in Figure 5 for a rising note, withΠ and Q * both shifting right in the parameter t -except that now Q * shifts farther right thanΠ, because in this
Theorem 5 Better counterfeiting technology raises counterfeit quality and verification effort, but reduces the verification rate. The least counterfeit note ∆ is unchanged.
Comparative Statics from the Hot-Potato Game
The Counterfeiting Rate
With free entry by counterfeiters, the counterfeiting rate κ is a free variable in our model. We now explore implications for our other market, the currency passing game. This market determines the counterfeiting rate, and thereby the passed rate. With our recursive structure, we may express the constant counterfeiting rate curveK in q-v space, and so visually deduce the comparative statics of the counterfeiting rate.
By (12), anything that raises the quality or verification rate inflates the counterfeiting rate. The constant counterfeiting locus is therefore downward sloping in q-v space. Figure 7 : Counterfeiting Rate. The constant counterfeiting locusK lies between the optimal quality locus Q * and the zero profit curveΠ. The middle panel builds on the bottom row of Figure 5 . With easier verification, the optimal quality locus shifts left (from Q H to Q L ). This also shifts to a lower constant counterfeiting rate locus K L , that is also lower for exogenous reasons. The right panel captures an improved counterfeiting technology. Unambiguously, the counterfeiting rate rises.
Lemma 4 (Slopes)
The slope ofK is negative, but greater thanΠ and less than Q * .
Falling legal costs pushes up both the quality and verification (by Theorem 2), unambiguously raising the counterfeiting rate -as seen in the left panel of Figure 7 . If the verification technology improves, then quality falls and verification rises, by Theorem 3. Since the constant counterfeiting locus is sandwiched between theΠ and Q * curves (Lemma 4), the new cat and mouse equilibrium yields a lower counterfeiting rate on this basis. But the counterfeiting rate (12) additionally falls at every (v, q), as in Figure 7 . Technological improvements in counterfeiting raise quality but depress verification (Theorem 5). Despite these countervailing effects, Lemma 4 allows us to deduce that the counterfeiting rate unambiguously falls. Altogether:
Theorem 6 The counterfeiting rate rises if the legal costs ℓ fall, the verification costs χ rise, or there is technological improvement in counterfeiting (lower costs c(q)).
With a rising denomination, quality and verification both increase (Theorem 4), but the counterfeiting rate (12) is separately pushed down by the higher note ∆.
We first find the primitives that bound the counterfeiting rate below one, and more strongly, prove that it vanishes at the least and highest counterfeit notes -just as in the example. First, examining (12), κ → 0 near the least counterfeit note ∆ since quality and the verification rate vanish, while ∆ ≥ ∆ > 0 and the discovery rate ρ ≥ αβ > 0. To see why the counterfeiting rate vanishes at high notes, eliminate the note ∆ from (12) using the quality optimality condition (5), Lemma 1:
Since ρ(v) ≥ αβ and χ(v) ≤ χ(1) < ∞, the counterfeiting rate is bounded above by a ratio of verification costs and marginal costs of quality. As the note ∆ explodes, so too does quality by Theorem 4, and (by assumption) its marginal cost c ′ (q). Then κ → 0.
Theorem 7
The counterfeiting rate vanishes as ∆ ↓ ∆ or ∆ ↑ ∞, and is bounded above by:
where η = lim q→0 qc ′ (q)/c(q).
This bound on the counterfeiting rate rises if counterfeiting is easier -lower legal costs ℓ, seizure rate 1 − f (0), or counterfeit costs, or a higher production level x. It falls when verification is more effective -a higher banking verification rate βα, or a lower perfect verification marginal cost χ ′ (1).
In the example in §3.4 with a linear passing fraction, the least counterfeit note ∆ = ℓ/x rises in the legal costs ℓ, the counterfeit quality and verification rate (14) fall, and the counterfeit rate (12) falls with sufficiently convex verification cost B > 2.
While counterfeiting never disappears, it can spiral out of control if it is cheap.
Completing the existence theorem for a counterfeiting equilibrium, we assume that the upper bound (19) is less than one, so that the counterfeiting rate is less than one.
Passed Counterfeit Rates Across Denominations
We have from equation (12):
Since quality and verification vanish as ∆ tends down to ∆ > 0 by Theorem 4, the marginal verification cost in (20) vanishes as ∆ ↓ ∆ > 0. Without appealing to the elasticity or log-concavity assumptions, Theorem 4 and equation (20) . So its peak must occur at a higher note, as seen in Figure 4 . Also, the passed rate will increasingly understate the actual counterfeiting problem at low notes.
Seized Counterfeit Money
The model is in steady-state. To wit, the counterfeit passage into circulation balances the passed money outflow:
. Also, the counterfeit production replenishes the seized and passed money outflow
The cat and mouse game alone affects the verification rate v, and so the passing fraction f (v), and the counterfeit-passed ratio (21). Theorems 2, 3, and 5 imply (a) below:
Corollary 2 (a) The counterfeit-passed ratio falls if legal costs rise or the counterfeiting technology improves, and rises if the verification technology improves. (b) The counterfeit-passed ratio rises less than proportionately in the denomination ∆,
with elasticity E ∆ (C/P ) = −E ∆ (f ) ∈ (0, 1).
Part (b) builds on Theorem 4. To see this, consider how a counterfeit $100 note may have higher quality than a counterfeit $5 note, and yet still pass less readily because it is much more carefully inspected. If quality were fixed, then zero profits in (4) would require that the passing fraction scale by one-half moving from $5 to $10 to $20. The denomination elasticity is then −1. But quality rises in the note, and this eats into profits. So the passing fraction falls less than inversely to the note, and its elasticity exceeds −1. The counterfeit-passed ratio C[∆]/P [∆] then inherits passing fraction properties via the steady-state equation (21): In our continuum model, the passing fraction becomes the share of production that the counterfeiter passes. This analysis sheds light on the criminal marketplace. If producers sell to middlemen, then legal costs are borne by both parties, and average costs overstate the "street price" of fake notes: Our two expressions for the passing fraction (4) and (21) from theory and data yield a simple upper bound on these prices:
Empirical Evidence
We take the denominations as given: Our data will come from the U.S. dollar denominations $1, $5, . . . , $100. The time period is specific to each ∆.
The Falling Counterfeit-Passed Ratio Over Time
There has been a sea change in the seized and passed time series since 1980. For the longest time, seized vastly exceeded passed counterfeit money, as seen in Figure 8 . But starting in 1986, and accelerating in 1995, the counterfeit-passed ratio began to tumble. Tables have turned: By far, most counterfeit money now is passed, 16 and the passing fraction has risen roughly from 10% to 80%. Our theory explains this change.
Seized Counterfeit Money
Our model is testable, and admits expressions for the levels of both seized and passed counterfeit money. We first explore consequences of the counterfeit entry game.
This explains our result in Figure 9 that the counterfeit-passed ratio has risen in the denomination in the USA 1995-2008 (as well as separately for 1995-99 and 2000-04) .
This trend also holds in Canada over the span 1980-2005 for all six paper denominations.
17 Corollary 2 also correctly predicts that the slopes in this log-log diagram (i.e. elasticities) are not only positive but also less than 1.
The implied US street price ceilings can be computed from Figure 9 , to get $3.37, $5.95, $9.30, $19.20, $35.70, respectively. Testing this awaits data. 15 We thank Pierre Duguay for this insight; he said the predicted street prices are realistic. In one recent American case, a Mexican counterfeiting ring discovered this year sold counterfeit $100 notes at 18% of face value to distributors, who then resold the counterfeit notes for 25-40% of face value. The money was transported across the border by women couriers, carrying the money. 16 The Annual Reports of the USSS supplied earlier data, and the Secret Service itself gave us more recent data. Seized is a more volatile series, as seen in Figure 8 , as it owes to random, maybe large, counterfeiting discoveries, and is also contemporaneous counterfeit money. By contrast, passed money is twice averaged: It has been found by thousands of individuals, and may have long been circulating. As an aside, if the counterfeit-passed ratio varies across denominations, then so must the verification rate, by Corollary 2. This empirical regularity is incompatible with a constant verification rate. It cannot be stochastic but exogenous, as in any paper that presumes verifiers observe a fixed authenticity signal -like Williamson (2002) .
We turn now to the cross-sectional observation that counterfeit scale and quality both rise in the note. As Table 1 depicts, the digitally-produced fraction falls in the note. In lieu of digital production, Judson and Porter (2003) find that 73.6% of passed $100 notes were circulars -many notes from the same source (i.e. large scale production). This was 19.2% of $50 notes, and less than 3% of other notes. Circulars are usually produced with printing presses, and are much higher quality. The "Supernote"
is the highest quality counterfeit on record. First found in 1990, this deceptive North Korean counterfeit $100 note was made from bleached $1 notes, with the intaglio printing process used by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing -missed by banks. Log Denomination Log (1+Seized/Passed) Figure 9 : USA Counterfeit Over Passed, Across Denominations. These are the counterfeit-passed ratios, averaged over 1995-2008, for non-Colombian counterfeits in the USA. Clearly, they rise in ∆. The sample includes almost ten million passed notes, and about half as many seized notes. Data points are labeled by pairs (∆, C(∆)/P (∆)). So for every passed $5 note, 0.33 have been seized on average. For this log-log graph, slopes are elasticities -positive and below one. We do not have data for this time span for the $1 note; it averages 0.23 for the years 1998 and 2005-8.
Passed Counterfeit Money
The implied verification costs in (20) are easily measured by ∆p [∆] . These are quite miniscule even for the highest notes. The passed rate is at most 1 per 10,000 annually.
Suppose the $100 note transacts at least four times per year. Then the passed rate p[∆] is at most 1 in 40,000, and marginal verification costs are at most $100/40,000, or one quarter penny per note. Yet such tiny verification costs drive our theory. Surprisingly, incentives explain behavior even when costs are very small.
Corollary 1 (a) predicts a vanishing passed rate for low notes ∆ near ∆. This obtains practically without caveat, and is strongly predictive of the data. Corollary 1 (b) predicts a falling passed rate at theoretically high enough notes, but this is not apparent in the US dollar data. Yet the Euro offers two higher value notes; the passed rate clearly drops at the 500 Euro note in Figure 10 . We first turn to passed counterfeit money, fleshing out implications of the hot potato game. 96, 19.46, 71.21, 72.03, 49.94, 81.43, respectively. 19 [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . Observe (a) the growth of inexpensive digital methods of production, and (b) lower denomination notes are more often digitally produced. Note 1995 Note 1996 Note 1997 Note 1998 Note 1999 Note 2000 Note 2001 Note 2002 Note 2003 Note 2004 Our theory assumes that notes trade hands once per "period". Unlike with the counterfeit-passed ratio, the passed rate is a flow over a stock, which skews the per transaction meaning. Yet the velocity is intuitively falling in the note. 20 The higher the note, fewer transaction opportunities a year represents. Interpreting annualized passed data in this light, the relevant "per transaction passed rate" rises from $50 to $100 note, and might always rise in the denomination. Yet this falling velocity surely cannot account for the more than twelve-fold drop in the passed rate at the 500 Euro note.
relevant measure for decision-making), the $100 note is unambiguously the most counterfeited note. 20 Lower denomination notes wear out faster, surely due to a higher velocity. Longevity estimates by the Federal Reserve Bank of NY [www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed01.html] are 1.8, 1.3, 1.5, 2, 4.6, and 7.4 months, respectively, for $1,. . . ,$100. Observe the disproportionate upward jump from $20 to $50 and then from $50 to $100. FRB (2003) has close longevity estimates.
Passed Money in the Banking System
(under construction) About $5-10 million of passed money hits the Federal Reserve yearly, missed by banks (see Table 12 ). Our next to the last piece of evidence for our costly stochastic verification story, this one solely applicable to money. The banking sector offers a reverse test of the model -for unlike how passed money is found, counterfeit money hitting banks has missed earlier detection. Ideally, this data would reflect just our behavioral assumptions of verifiers, and not of banks. While not quite possible, the evidence is still compelling.
We have maintained (bank model #1) that banks find counterfeit notes at a fixed rate α ∈ (0, 1). The equilibrium discovery rate
thus rises in the note. Since we assume that counterfeiters do not attempt to pass their money in a bank, this simple model of bank behavior is moot for equilibrium predictions of the effort, quality, and verification rate (as seen in our example in §3.4). While the counterfeiting rate expression reflects the discovery rate, the passed rate does not.
Two other parsimonious models of bank behavior might better apply for all notes. Since we argued that counterfeit money produced by large scale printing presses occurs at high notes and has a distinctly better quality by Theorem 4, we could just posit a lower fixed bank discovery rate α < α for these higher notes (bank model #2).
Commercial banks transfer damaged or unneeded notes to the Federal Reserve Banks (FRB). The FRB found 21% of all passed counterfeits in 2002, but a much larger portion of the low denomination notes. A priori, this reverse monotonicity might seem surprising since the lowest notes are easiest for verifiers to catch. This anomaly offers more support for our model, and is fleshed out more fully in Figure 11 .
21
To begin with, observe that intuitively, the fraction φ[∆] of notes that banks transfer to the FRB each period should fall in ∆, since longevity rises in the denomination. We first consider banks, for which we lack data, but have less couched predictions. To see this, observe that a bank finds a passed note when (i) it is fake (chance κ), and (ii) the last verifier prior to the bank missed it (chance 1 − v), and then ( it in the bank (chance β), and then (iv) the bank finds it (chance α). Conditional on (i), events (ii)-(iv) are independent. So the reciprocal bank share of passed notes is:
= passed notes found by verifiers, commercial banks, or an FRB passed notes found by commercial banks
The nonconstant terms are (resp.) increasing and falling due to φ. The logic for this result builds on the last. An FRB finds a passed note when events (i)-(iii) hold, and then (iv) ′ the bank misses the counterfeit (chance 1 − α), and (v)
transfers it to an FRB (chance φ). Unlike with commercial banks, the counterfeit buck stops at an FRB, and it is surely found. The reciprocal of the FRB share σ[∆] is then:
Write the first two terms as the product of two factors: The first factor 1/φ is rising. Under bank model #1, the second factor is an increasing term plus a constant, and thus the product is increasing. Under bank models #2 and #3, the second factor can decrease fast enough to swamp the first term: In bank model #2, α drops down, and so greater quality depresses the bank discovery rate α more than v rises, and both terms can drop.
In bank model #3, α can continuously drop if quality quickly rises in the note. This corollary makes sense of the data in Figure 11 . At low denominations, notes are mostly made digitally, quality rises slowly, and the FRB share is falling. In this range, our costly verification story dominates, depressing the FRB passed note share. But at the $50 and $100 notes, quality jumps up, and the banks miss the counterfeits more often (bank models #2 and #3). The FRB share rises in years for which we have data.
The above exercises focused solely on the counterfeit notes. For a different lens on counterfeits in the banking system, let us consider the internal bank passed rate:
passed notes hitting bank total notes hitting bank
The approximation is accurate within κ ≪ 0.0001, or 0.01%. Likewise, the internal FRB passed rate, or fraction of passed notes hitting it that are counterfeit, is given by:
More passed notes hit a bank or FRB with a higher counterfeit rate. For instance, α can be identified as the ratio of the internal passed rates ξ/ζ. Thus motivated, we normalize (23) and (24) by the passed rate p = ρκ, eliminating the counterfeit rate. The bank share data in Figure 11 were influenced by the unmeasured but surely falling FRB transfer rates φ. These new passed rate ratios below
no longer suffer from this problem, but a new one. The discovery rate ρ[∆] increases in the velocity, while the internal bank and FRB passed rates are unaffected by it.
Since the velocity falls in the note, graphs of these ratios are biased upward in the denomination (versus a per transaction basis) -just like the passed rates in §6.3. instead rises from $20 to $50 and further from $50 to $100, and is otherwise the same. 1998, 2002, and 2005 , the ratio of the FRB and overall passed rates is falling monotonically only from the $1 through the $20 ( Figure 12 ). But in each case, it turns up at the $50 and further at $100 -precisely the notes for which high quality circulars are common.
Conclusion
Counterfeiting is an unusual crime that induces two closely linked conflicts: counterfeiters against verifiers and law enforcement, and verifiers against verifiers. The focus on the first conflict in the small literature bipasses the key role of the second conflict in explaining passed counterfeit money. In fact, seized money has only amounted to about 10% of counterfeit money since the late 1990s, down from 90% in the 1970s.
We develop a novel strategic theory of counterfeiting subsuming both of the above conflicts. In our paper, bad guys wish to cheaply forge a counterfeit that passes for the real thing. A higher quality counterfeit is more costly, but better deceives good guys, and so passes more often. Good guys raise their guard with either dearer notes or greater counterfeit prevalence. Bad guys improve their quality with dearer notes or less careful good guys. As more bad guys enter, the counterfeiting rate rises. These three forces equilibrate in our large game. The endogenous verification effort explains the rising counterfeit-passed ratio at low denominations, while variable quality counterfeit production justifies why this rise eventually tapers off. The model can capture changes in law enforcement, counterfeiting technology, or verification ease. It can explain a new set of stylized facts about counterfeiting across denominations that we identify.
On the normative side, we uncover a novel limit on the welfare losses of counterfeiting. We also predict that the unobserved counterfeiting rate is hill-shaped. We shed new light on the development of fiat currency -i.e. whose face value greatly exceeds its intrinsic cost: Since the counterfeiting rate is the ratio of verification to production costs, fiat currency required easily verified characteristics not easily reproduced. The discovery chance of counterfeits depends on the verifiers' effort and counterfeit quality. Endogenous verification is a new assumption in this literature. Among the many possible functional forms for the verification rate, we have found an especially tractable one. Making a log-concavity assumption (possibly new for cost functions), we can rationalize the cross-sectional and time series properties of passed and seized money. This verification function should be useful in understanding counterfeit goods, or other economic settings where a conflict of wills determines a monitoring chance.
The passing game is a new use of supermodular games in monetary economics. 22 Finally, we return to the literature. Existing monetary work all explores a general equilibrium value of the currency. Our theory applies for the actual case of minimal counterfeiting, where the verification rate is the "price" that adjusts. The existing general equilibrium literature lets the price of money equilibrate the model. This is also done in the best papers on counterfeit goods Grossman and Shapiro (1988) . Our point of departure is thus to replace a priced asset with a new decision margin -individuals can continuously adjust their verification effort. We feel that a fixed value of notes is a good approximation for the USA now we examine where counterfeit notes are extremely rare. It agrees with the common observation that higher denominations may be declined if verification is too hard ("No $100 bills accepted"), but are almost never discounted. 23 Endogenizing the price of money cannot explain the current variation in seized or passed counterfeit levels across notes, since we have argued that one needs a variable varification effort. Not surprisingly, there has been no attempt by the existing literature to match the data.
One could imagine a general equilibrium setting -combining our insights and this literature -yielding a model where notes are both verified and discounted.
24 That model would best capture runaway counterfeiting during say the Confederacy. It would also help understand counterfeit goods, where the face value price is endogenous.
A Appendix: Omitted Proofs
A.1 Optimal Quality and Zero Profit Curves: Proof of Lemma 3
Claim 1 (Strict SOC) The second order condition at an optimum is strict: Π< 0.
Proof of Claim:
The SOC for maximizing Π(q, e, ∆) is locally necessary:
The total derivative of the quality first order condition (5) is:
STEP 2: UNIQUENESS. To see uniqueness, we return to (q, e) space. Assume two solutions (q 1 , e 1 ) and (q 2 , e 2 ). Then q 1 = q 2 , for if q 1 = q 2 then e 1 = e 2 , since profits fall in effort. WLOG, let q 1 < q 2 . Consider the change in profits Π(q, e, ∆) from (q 1 , e 1 ) to (q 2 , e 2 ) along the smooth curve H = {(q, e) : Π q (q, e, ∆) = 0, q 1 ≤ q ≤ q 2 } where quality is optimal. Since Π e < 0, we arrive at the contradiction via line integrals:
0 − 0 = Π(q 2 , e 2 , ∆) − Π(q 1 , e 1 , ∆) = H (Π q , Π e ) · (dq, de) = e 2 e 1 Π e de > 0
A.3 Verification Comparative Static: Proof of Theorem 3
Normalize V(v, 0) ≡ v, and thus V v (v, 0) ≡ 1. Write the zero profit identity (4) using the verification rate v = V(V (e, q), t):
∆xf (V(V (e, q), t)) − c(q) − ℓ = 0 Differentiate in t. Since q derivatives cancel by the Envelope Theorem, V eė = V t < 0.
Then effort e falls in the technology t. Since χ ′′ /χ ′ ≤ χ ′ /χ by log-concavity (7), the ratio χ ′ (V(v, t))/χ(V(v, t)) rises in t. So the Q * locus in (6) shifts left in t.
A.4 Denomination Comparative Statics: Theorem 4
(This proof currently assumes f (v) = f (0)(1 − v) Υ .)
A. Initial Quality, Effort, and Verification. By continuity of (4) and (5), the limits as ∆ ↓ ∆ of e and q, and so v, exist. must explode as ∆ ↓ ∆. This is impossible because log χ is concave. 
by the quality FOC (6). Since q[∆] → 0 as ∆ ↓ ∆ by Step 2, and c ′ (0) < ∞ by cost convexity, it is impossible that Π q (q[∆ n ], e[∆ n ], ∆ n ) = 0 at all ∆ n . Hence, v = 0.
B. Quality Explodes at Large Notes.
